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Conflicts Theory for Dummies: Aprks le Deluge, Where Are

We on Producers Liability?
PhaedonJohn Kozyris"

I. INTRODUCTION

Conflicts scholarship in the United States has been graced, laced (and
burdened!) with lots of theory, reflecting the learned, cosmopolitan and
utopian bend of its disciples. This preoccupation continues, as evidenced in
the vocabulary about "rethinking," "myths," etc., despite ominous traces of
fatigue! Unfortunately, it isnot uncommon for those who express dissatisfaction
with the repetition of what we all know all too well (historical evolution and a
summary of most of the approaches, with reference to the key cases, every time),
and who start with a promise to guide us out of the labyrinth, to feel obligated to
restate what they purport to avoid with the result of more bulk and less float.
Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to label this continuing inundation of
theory a "deluge," 2 which makes it imperative for us not to add more water, but
instead try to salvage something useful in the Ark to guide us for what is coming
"apr~s"!
I hope that this explanation lends support to my proposing here to be too
succinct and practical, and thus address only certain central "facts" and "faults"
which have dominated, and bedeviled, the conflicts scene. I consider such an
approach suitable to a festschrift honoring Professor Symeonides, a uniquely
distinguished conflicts expert who not only is a major scholar but has been active
in the "real" conflicts world of legislative solutions and who also presents us every
year with a fascinating and learned report and commentary on what is actually
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law (Emeritus), Universities of Ohio State and Thessaloniki.
1. Two recent comprehensive pieces, with many references to the prior literature and largely
negative in tone, are Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth ofChoiceofLaw-Rethinking Conflicts, 97 Mich.
L. Rev. 2448 (1999) ("Myth"), and Stewart E. Sterk, The MarginalRelevance of Choice of Law
Theory, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949 (1994) ("Marginal Relevance"). See also M. Reimann, Savigny's
entieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int'l L.
Triumph? Choice ofLaw in ContractCases at the Close ofthe ,iv
571 (1999); Gene R. Shreve, Notesfrom the Eye ofthe Storm, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 823 (1997); and Larry
Kramer, RethinkingChoiceofLaw, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1990) ("Rethinking"). Professor Friedrich
Juenger has provided us with wide-ranging insights on American conflicts theory, enriched by a
comparative and historical perspective. See especially,Friedrich Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate
Justice (Nighof 1993).
2. When the "ice age of conflicts jurisprudence" melted under the blows of the "modern"
theories, more water was added to the "dismal swamp"(pessimistic term about the possibility ofescape)
and even the "well-watered plateau" (a more optimistic characterization) ended up in a flood! Thus,
I propose "deluge" as a more neutral description! For another metaphor, see Perry Dane, Conflict of
Laws, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 209 (ed. Dennis Patterson 1996):
"More recently, choice of law has sometimes resembled the law's psychiatric ward. It is a place of odd
fixations and schizophrenic visions."
*
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happening down there in the courts. Thus, Iwill concentrate on some simple points
which should appear obvious but are often forgotten in the hustle-hence the title
"conflicts theory for dummies"! I beg forgiveness from those who may find my
style too imperious and self-righteous, and I want to assure them that it is not due
to an attitude but to a concern, perhaps excessive, over hedging and
inconclusiveness.
II. A SEARCH FOR MEANING
My first point is methodological and can be stated quite plainly.
Conflicts law cannot and should not escape the simple requirement that
applies to every law, to wit, that it have intelligible, readable, meaningful
content and that its body of provisions (rules, principles, approaches,
purposes and what not) lead to reasonably and consistently predictable results
in most contexts. I may be revealing here my Napoleonic syndrome, but
telling the courts in each conflicts case to make a choice and fashion the
applicable law "ad hoc" and "anew" (i.e. without legislative or precedential
direction) on the basis of what is right (just, proper, good, suitable,
interested, etc.), as is often done under the prevailing conflicts theories,
appears to me not only inconsistent with the basic principles of the
separation of powers, not only burdensome and potentially arbitrary beyond
reason, not only disorienting to the transacting persons, but essentially empty
of meaning. I am not claiming that this, let us call it "requirement of
predictability,"

necessarily leads to just or totally certain results or that it

places the particular choice rule beyond challenge. But unpredictable law is
not law to begin with. I am afraid that the prevailing conflicts theories in
the United States (the many variations of interest analysis, the mostsignificant-relationship test by itself, and the "better" or "modem" law
approaches) pose a serious problem of indeterminacy. Except as they serve
as incantations to cover up some other clandestine basis of choice (e.g., proforum, pro-plaintiff, pro-recovery-in-tort, pro-resident, which we will address
in those contexts), they leave us stranded in ambiguity. As teachers, we find
it difficult to teach a course where there are only questions and where every
position is as justified-or as wrong-as any other, where the students can
defend with equal poise the choice of any law3 and where the judges (who
themselves are desperately seeking concrete guidance) are prompted to choose
instead whatever they want, to do the "right thing" and hope for the best.
Equally problematic is the reference to all possible connections and all
imaginable bases of choice, leaving it to the decision maker to figure it all
out in the case at hand. It is one thing to challenge, debate, and evaluate
3. Professor Shreve has eloquently described the predicament ofboth teachers and students in
the "Janus-faced" world of the new conflicts. Gene R. Shreve, The Odds Against Teaching Conflicts,
27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 587, 590-92 (1996). See also, Gene R. Shreve, Teaching Conflicts, Improving the

Odds, 90 Mich. L Rev. 1672 (1992).
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particular rules, methods, approaches, outcomes, etc. and quite another to set sail

rudderless on the sea of relativity! 4
In this context, it seems that the "lex loci delicti" rule of the First
Restatement of Conflicts was predictable enough, in the sense that it
provided ex ante a choice (not necessarily always a good one) for most
actual situations.' Lest we forget that "hard cases do not the best law
make," the very small number of cases where a traditional "escape clause"
(renvoi, characterization, public policy, etc.) had in fact been used did not

undermine the "requirement of predictability" of the rule. Indeed, these were
not "cutting edge" paradigms and resulted often from the fact that the
substantive law itself was unclear, e.g., on the contractual or tortious nature
of the liability and on the cumulation thereof. The exaggeration of the
"escape clause" problem in traditional conflicts, as if all rules do not or
should not contain (reasonably predictable, narrow) exceptions, is the
misbegotten offspring of the "realist jurisprudence" challenge to conflicts."

4. The antiformalism that has dominated American legal theory in the last fifty years,
while useful as an antidote, lends itselfto utopian extremes when it takes over.... The
broader the reference to a universe ofmultiple, cumulative, potentially inconsistent factors,
incorporating all conceivable personal and territorial links ofparties, events, disputes and
activities, the easier it becomes to argue in each case for both sides with equal plausibility,
Intuitive ad hoc solutions are not only
and the more arbitrary the eventual choice ....
logistically burdensome, requiring extensive original explanation and justification each time,
but also succumb to arbitrariness, foment unpredictability, and risk producing too many
camels and not enough horses!
P. John Kozyris, Values and Methods in Choice of Law for Products Liability: A Comparative
Comment on Statutory Solutions, 38 Am. J.Comp. L. 475,484 (1990) ("Values and Methods"): "The
conflicts revolution has been pregnant for too long. The conflicts misery index, which is the ratio of
problems to solutions, or ofverbiage to result, is now higher than ever." P.John Kozyris, Foreword and
Symposium on Interest Analysis in Conflict of Laws: An Inquiry into Fundamentals with a Side
Postscript: Glance atProducts Liability,46 Ohio St. L J.457,458 (1985) ("Side Glance"). Cf P.John
Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions ofthe ALI's Complex Litigation Project: A Glass HalfFull?, 54 La.
L. Rev. 953,956 (1994) ("HalfFull"): "Conflicts theorists.., have been notoriously indifferent to the
issue of efficiency, treating every case as a unique specimen calling for custom-made handling on the
tacit assumption that litigational resources are infinite." It should berecognized that the American Law
Institute's Complex Litigation Project: Statutory Recommendations and Analysis (1994), which has not
been adopted yet by the U.S. Congress, makes a valiant attempt in Section 6 to provide sufficient
guidance on how to choose the applicable law, closing the escape avenues and allowing for the possible
division of the various classes of claimants into groups for conflicts purposes. For an excellent
commentary on the Project, with reference also to conflicts theory, see Fred I.Williams, The Complex
Litigation Project's Choice ofLaw Rulesfor Mass Torts and How to Escape Them, 1995 BYU L. Rev.
1081.
5. Cf William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics ofConflict
ofLaws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1011 (1999) ("AllenO'Hara"): "[P]rimary predictability is ..the primary goal of... choice-of-law ... [as recognized also
by Professor Baxter]." Id. at 1041. "[Tihe widespread rejection of the First Restatement rules was a
classic illustration of the 'nirvana fallacy'. . . . [A] modified First Restatement approach ... is the
preferred alternative [and produces sound results in most cases]." Id. at 1043.
6. "(Conflicts was] killed by a realism intended to save it." Lawrence Lessing, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1403, 1407 (1996).
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To be sure, law-in-action does not always reflect law-in-the-books, and
surely, in choosing the applicable law, the judge is tempted, as also when
he applie purely internal law, to do "justice in the individual case." But
this does not mean justice "imbroglio" in the slippery paths of good
intentions. Likewise, the long-standing (endless?) debate about the
relationship between positive and natural law has no special relevance to
conflicts. The choice criteria and methods are as much natural or positive
as for any other kind of law.
It is quite ironic that the end result ofthe challenge to the "escape clauses" of
the traditional conflicts system has been not their abolition but their replacement by,
e.g., the "most significant relationship" black hole, defined under the free-for-all
and conflicting "modem" criteria of Section 6 of the Restatement Second of
Conflicts which go around in circles and place any concrete conflicts choice in
jeopardy.7
III. THE TERRITORIAL AND PERSONAL IMPERATIVES

My second point is that, in its search for the millennium, conflicts
theory has been dreaming (unsuccessfully) to escape again from another
major inherent limiting factor, that the spatial application of law is
determined basically only through territorial and personal connections.' On
this foundational issue, not much progress has been made since the time of
the statutists. The name of the game is location, location, location: location
of events, things, persons. Indeed, most conflicts approaches, old and new,
in the end and however willy-nilly, require some "contact(s)" between the
parties and events of the dispute and the state whose law is to be applied.'
Even the result-oriented scholars, e.g., F. Juenger (fashion a "modem"
substantive rule) or R. Leflar (prefer the "best" substantive rule), require
some prior contact with the state of the applicable law. We should also
remember that even a pure "lex fori" approach is grounded on location,
since the forum itself is predetermined by jurisdictional "contacts." Of
course, the weight given to the various territorial and personal contacts may
differ and the methods of evaluating and using them may reflect diverse
criteria, but this is another story which we will address later. However, accusing the
FirstRestatement ofConflictsof"wooden territorialism" (would "personalism" be
any less wooden?) both overstates the challenge and disorients the debate.
7. "[lI]t isthe agnostic conflicts theories themselves that give the green light tojudges to engage
in the grand escape ofdoingjustice in the individual case, or choosing the better law or considering the
social and economic factors, without any guidance." Kozyris, Half Full,supra note 4,at 960. This
criticism should not be taken to mean that no conflicts rule should contain an exception or alimitation.
It addresses only the vague open-ended nature of particular trumps. For a thorough review and
evaluation both oftraditional and of "modem" types, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception Clauses
in American Conflicts Law, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 813 (Supp. 1994).

8. See Kozyris, Values andMethods, supra note 4,at 486-87.
9. See Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 247-53 (2d ed. 1995) ("Directions").
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At this point, I cannot resist the temptation of quoting Judge Posner's language
from a recent builder's tort liability case, Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp.'" The
plaintiff's argument for Illinois law, because of defendant's solicitation of
plaintiff there together with plaintiff's Illinois domicile," proved too much
for Judge Posner. He saw it as tantamount to saying that "each guest be
permitted to carry with him the tort law of his state or country, provided that he is
staying in a hotel that had advertised there."' 2 The plaintiff could not have thought
that he was:
carrying his domiciliary law with him, like a turtle's house, to every
foreign country he visited ... [nor could he, while] eating dinner
with a Mexican in Acapulco, feel himself cocooned in Illinois law,
like citizens of imperial states in the era of colonialism who were
granted extraterritorial privileges in weak or dependent states. Law
is largely territorial, and people have at least a vague intuition of this.
They may feel safer in foreign hotels owned by American chains, but they
do not feel that they are on American soil and governed by American
law. 3
Acceptance ofthe plaintiff's argument would subject a hotel operator like Sheraton
"to a hundred different bodies of tort law,"' 4each imposing potentially inconsistent
duties of care. "A resort might have a system of firewalls that under the law of
some states or nations might be considered essential to safety and in others might
be considered a safety hazard."' 5 These dangers are avoided by the application of
the "lex loci delicti [which] is the only choice of law that won't impose potentially
debilitating legal uncertainties on businesses that cater to a multinational clientele
while selecting the rule of decision most likely to optimize safety."' 6 For, in the
absence ofunusual circumstances the place where the tort occurred is the place that
has:
the greatest interest in striking a reasonable balance among safety, cost,
and other factors pertinent to the design and administration of a system of
tort law. Most people affected, whether as victims or as tortfeasors, by
accidents and other injury-causing events are generally residents of the
jurisdiction in which the event takes place. So if law can be assumed to
be generally responsive to the values and preferences of the people who
live in the community that formulated the law, the law of the place of the
accident can be expected to reflect the values and preferences of the
10. 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999). See also, his comments in Barron v. Ford Motor Co. ofCanada
Ltd., 965 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1992) and Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th
Cir. 1987).

11.

Spinozzi, 174 F.3d at 845.

12.

Id.

13.

Id. at 846.

14.

Id. at 845.

15.

Id.

16.

Id. at 846.
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people most likely to be involved in accidents--can be expected, in other
words, to be responsive and responsible law, law that internalizes the costs
and benefits of the people affected by it.'
IV. CONFLICTS PERFECTIONISM VERSUS THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING
NATIONAL LAW WITHIN THE "GLOBAL VILLAGE"

Conflicts theory has been plagued by the implied assumption that it is possible
to come up with the 'best" answer to every choice dilemma and that if we fail, the
problem is with us; somehow we have not been doing it right or trying hard enough.
My thirdpoint, which needs reiteration every time, is that this is not true and that
in many multistate contexts it is increasingly difficult to come up with any plausible
choice. Indeed, we must recognize, and resign ourselves to the modem reality that,
the greater the mobility of persons and events, the lesser the isolation of national
spaces, and the fuller the integration and interpenetration ofmarkets and societies,
the less suitable is any local-national law to provide a satisfactory exclusive answer
to a legal question. To the extent that the multistate or international regulation lags
behind the related reality, and the transnational transaction is squeezed into the
straightjacket of local law, we do have an inherent imperfection that is beyond the
capability of conflicts to redress. Thus, not all of the "bizarre" results of conflicts
analysis are due to its own shortcomings and we should not assume that we are
always to blame." Consequently, Professor Juenger's instinct to seek, for every
diffuse multistate situation, a "modem" substantive rule, moves in the right
direction. My major disagreement with him relates to the source of the rule, i.e., I
question whether the national judge has the authority, the knowledge and the
capability to develop such an ad hoc common-law type "jus gentium."
Quite plainly, the reach of a substantive rule ideally should be co-extensive (as
broad or narrow) as the scope of the activity that it regulates. For example, it is
good that, finally, multistate sales are subject to a uniform law throughout the
United States (UCC) and that international sales are basically governed under the
multinational legal regime of the Vienna Convention on the International Sales of
Goods, not the internal law of any of the states or nations of contact. In many other
fields oflaw, however, including unfortunately many "modem" ones, the short rule
does not match the long activity. Let us not mince our words. Is it not ridiculous
for single-event transnational mass disasters, such as typical airplane accidents, to
be subjected to the law of any one particular nation (the Warsaw Convention has
limited application), let alone the law ofany one state of the United States? With
all due respect, any conflicts approach in that context will be equally ridiculous.
How about producers liability for consumer goods? When typically each category
of the many best-known and frequently-used products (and/or their components)
are designed, made, promoted, distributed, and used in different locations at
different times by mobile persons from different states, does it make any sense to
17.
18.

Id. at 844-45.
Kozyris, Hal/Full,supra note 4, at 953-54.
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try to identify one local law to govern the related rights and liabilities? Yet, the
many attempts to federalize the law in the United States failed due largely to
opposition by the self-interested trial bar; and, internationally, almost nothing has
been done. So any conflicts approach in this field is bound to be imperfect.
Turning to another burgeoning area, insurance coverage for environmental
pollution, universal or at least broad standards would be preferable to the state-bystate regulation. But even in their absence, making sure that the insurance policy
covers the damage at the local site under local law is not best approached through
convoluted contract conflicts, by forcibly inserting such a clause into foreign
contracts between foreign persons, but directly, e.g., by requiring the operator of
any local site to obtain insurance that so covers the risk. Cyberspace poses another
virtually insoluble conflicts problem. In the absence of universal regulation, the
the state of origination in many contexts makes
expedient of applying the law of
19
simple, if not simplistic, sense.
V. THE QUESTIONABLE "LOCALISM" OF CONFUCTS

My fourth point is equally fundamental and relates to the overall philosophy
of the conflictual method. The thrust of traditional conflicts was to seek the best
choice-of-law system for multilateral or at least bilateral, national or international,
application. Within the United States, this trend was reinforced by the
constitutional limitations on state authority resulting from the Full Faith and Credit,
2
the Due Process, the Privileges and Immunities and the Equal Protection Clauses.

Internationally, the spirit of cooperation, comity, and mutuality resulted in the
crystallization of choice of law rules in the many Hague Conventions. Unilateral
choice rules or parochial provisions on spatial application within substantive
statutes were rare and frowned upon.
During the first half of the twentieth century, the only serious challenge
to this multilateral, internationalist approach came from the so-called "local

19. Cf.J.Goldsmith,Against Cyberanarchy, Occasional Papers from the Law School, University
of Chicago No. 40 (1999) and Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants.Mice and Privacy: InternationalChoice
of Law and the Internet, 32 Int'l Law 991 (1998).
20. The importance ofthese clauses, especially as they restrict the authority ofthe state to choose
the applicable law in a manner that disfavors citizens from other U.S. states and as they, therefore,
support a territorialist main thrust of conflicts, has received increased attention in the literature. The
piece that focused the debate was John Hart Ely, Choice ofLaw andthe State'sInterestin Protecting
its Own, 23 Win. &Mary L. Rev. 173 (1981). For other significant contributions, see Roosevelt, Myth,
supranote 1, especially at 2534-38; Jefferey L.Rensberger, Who Was Dick?ConstitutionalLimitations
on State Choice ofLaw, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 37; Earl M. Maltz, The Full Faithand CreditClauseand
the FirstRestatement: The Place of Baker v. General Motors Corp., in Choice ofLaw Theory, 73 Tul.
L. Rev. 305 (1998); Scott Fruehwald, ConstitutionalConstraintson State ChoiceofLaw, 24 U. Dayton
L. Rev. 39 (1998); and Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsofChoice ofLaw, 92 Colum. L Rev. 249 (1992). Cf. Thomas M. Reavley
& Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old Rule for New Reasons: Place ofInjury as a FederalSolution to
ChoiceofLaw in Single-Accident Mass-TortCases, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1992) and Perry Dane, Vested
Rights, "Vestedness, "and Choice of Law, 96 Yale J.L. 1191 (1987).
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law" theories, which made the rather arcane (and largely inconsequential)
point that the judge "domesticated" the foreign substantive rule before
applying it. A related, and more important, debate is whether at some point
the "lex fori" should be given some extra weight. Again, we ended up with
a pragmatic consensus that, while the law of the forum as such is not to be
preferred, the judge surely is influenced by it and that, unless another choice
is indicated, in the end he does and should (except in the most extreme
circumstances) apply it residually.
In recent times, however, the multilateral, internationalist, forum-neutral trend
has been decisively reversed, especially within the United States. It is quite
remarkable that this happened almost entirely in and through conflicts theory, in the
absence of any legislative direction or concern and against the desperate demand
ofthe courts for more manageable and less state-centered criteria. It is no secret that
it was Professor Brainerd Currie, through his "interests analysis," who charmed and
browbeat many conflicts scholars into conceiving of the state first, as a parochial
power giant who, second, in every case ofpotential choice of law, would chase after
its own selfish "interests." As to the first point, Currie was right, as a matter of
separation ofpowers, to argue that the judge should not depart from his own law in
the absence of a legislative mandate. But as surely, he was wrong in suggesting that
the legislatures were in fact giving some consideration to the spatial application of
the substantive rules that they were adopting (remember the statutists?) and, even
more so, that in the dark chambers of their mind, they would "wish" to abandon the
prevailing multilateral and state-and-party neutral conflicts system in the private
law sphere (reinventing a point earlier made in Germany by Waechter without much
appeal).
We will address Currie's second point about "interests" in the next section. In
the meantime, I must confess that I find it puzzling-and disheartening-that a
serious and persistent critic of interest analysis, Professor Lea Brilmayer, has
focused her challenge on the "fictitiousness" ofthe purported "legislative intention"
suggested by Currie,2 ' ,neglecting the trap of parochialism, and keeps repeating that
she is not trying to tell the states what to do in this field and that choice of law may
be addressed from a purely "internal perspective."2" While it may be true that
neither international law nor the U.S. constitutional mandates impose strict
limitations, it seems to me that it is quite appropriate and desirable for the conflicts
scholar not to glorify state arbitrariness, but to provide the much-needed and
demanded guidance on the best ways to achieve justice through choice of law in
multistate contexts. Indeed, rare if not non-existent are the cases where we detect
a judicial jubilation with a newly-found freedom to decide cases unshackled by
choice rules; and there is no indication whatsoever that legislatures have aparochial
perspective.
21.

See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations

46 Ohio St. L.J. 459, 475 (1985), and Lea Brilmayer, InterestAnalysis andthe Myth ofLegislative

Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392 (1980).
22. Brilmayer, Directions,supranote 9, at 173-74, 194-96. Also, her fairness concern ifdirected

toward individuals, not states in terms of their power and authority. Id.at 239.
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VI. THE PERVERSE "SELFISHNESS" OF INTEREST ANALYSIS

Thefifth point is that I disagree with Currie's main thesis that the states do, or
should, play the game of conflicts in order to get some selfish advantage out ofit;
that, in the private law sphere where conflicts operates, the states do not merely
adopt rules which they consider substantively proper and just but also wish to
exercise the power over their application in a manner that will bring revenues to
them or will benefit their "people" at the expense of the outsiders or will

govern the world. The Currie thesis not only lacks support world-wide and
U.S.-wide in the legislative texts and histories, both substantive and
conflictual, as well as in the judicial attitudes toward choice of law, but is
questionable on its merits and on its "beggar-thy-neighbor," discriminatory,
"imperialist" implications. 3
In retrospect, and despite all the dithyrambs that have been piled up on them,
a simple-minded person like me cannot help but wonder by what logic the opinions
of Judge Fuld in Babcock v. Jackson,24 and Judge Traynor in Bernkrant v.
Fowler,25 were supposed to usher a "conflicts revolution" in favor of

parochial state interests rather than merely explore the limitations of territorialism
already in place in favor of the personal contacts in the (exceptional) situations

where the latter were concentrated in another state. These cases extended an
invitation to refine and particularize the rules (e.g. as happened later the Neumeier

23. [Interestanalysisreduces ch6ice of law] mostly to aprocess offindingjustifications for
the imposition of local law whenever there are minimal reasons to support it, with particular
emphasis on fiscal benefits to the forum. This parochialism and selfishness, cultivated, in
the interests of a supposed modernity, mostly by academics and not having been activated
by legislative orjudicial signals, sets back the common conflicts enterprise in many ways.
Kozyris, Values and Methods, supra note 4, at 485-86.

Indeed, interest analysis is becoming as diverse as Marxism or Christianity. It has been
subdivided into at least three major groupings. At the right we find the Orthodox, whose
prophet remains Brainerd Currie. The middle is occupied by Reformists, who modify the
formula but stick with the recipe. At the other end stand the Unitarians, who want to
conduct policy analysis their own way and whose left wing appears reconciled to neutral
conflicts rules, but differs from traditional conflicts principally in preferring personal over
territorial contacts.
Kozyris, Side Glance,supra note 4, at 457-58. "[l]nterest analysis has done a disservice to federalism
and internationalism by relentlessly pushing a viewpoint which inevitably leads to conflicts chauvinism
or, more accurately, tribalism in view of the emphasis on the nation being a group ofpeople." Id. at

577. "Conflicts has become a tale of a thousand-and-one cases. When a new case comes down, interest
analysts rush to co-opt it, not by arguing that it is the best or the most acceptable, but by rejoicing that
it is supportable and not totally wrong." Id. at 578. See also, Kozyris, HaltfFull,supranote 4, at 96364. For a thorough challenge to this theory, see Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict ofLaws: A Critiqueof
Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1984). Professor Sedler remains the last of the interest
analysis purists. See, e. g., Robert A. Sedler, A Real World Perspective on Choiceof Law, 48 Mercer
L. Rev. 781 (1997).
24. 12 N.Y.2d 473,240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
25. 360P.2d906(Cal. 1961).
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v. Kuehner26 way), not to overthrow the conflictual method and especially not to
introduce the concept of the State as a Conflicts Leviathan, bent on manipulating
choice-of-law to enrich itself or to prefer its own citizens against the foreigners, or
even to impose its own sense ofjustice on the world.
It seems to me that legislatures and courts overwhelmingly used to and still
continue to create and apply substantive rules on their internal merits and are
content to leave the spatial scope to conflicts rules-approaches that are
reasonable, bilateral and neutral in terms of their impact on the equal
sovereignty of other states and on the fair treatment of people. In this spirit,
we should support a broad reading and an effective application of the abovementioned U.S. constitutional limitations on the excessive outreach of state power
and extend this logic through comity to the international community. The
encouragement of a parochial, selfish attitude by conflicts theory has been perverse
and wrong.
Professor Brilmayer should be praised for being the one not only to talk
emptily about but really to try to "modernize" conflicts through game theory,
27
prisoner's dilemmas, stag hunts and the law-and-economics perspective, and for
focusing on the key connections between choice-of-law and jurisdiction and choiceof-law and regulation. However, the assumption that a state should approach choice
of law with the idea that it will derive some (selfish) gain out of it gives a wrong
signal.
Currie's interest analysis was also burdened with two fundamental ambiguities
that neither he nor his successors addressed adequately: (a) How far should the
federal (central) authority limit, through constitutional provisions, the state pursuit
of selfish local interests and a race to the bottom where eventually all lose?
Of course, the same issue arises under international comity. Currie's
"enlightened and restrained" interpretation of interests was only a beginning
and remains without a satisfactory follow-up; and (b) How important is the
domiciliary connection as such? Indeed, after all is said and done analyzing
purported interests, does not the Currie theory boil down to preferring personalism
over territorialism? What is the justification for this bias? What evidence is there
that states do (or should) focus on the affiliation of "peoples" rather than on the
location of "events and things," especially in an era of increasing personal and
material mobility?
Finally, the indeterminacy and multiplicity of the purported local state
"interests" in choice oflaw contexts, coupled with the need to take some notice of
those of other states, makes the process too complex and arduous and may often
lead to the simple expedient of either applying the law ofthe forum, as discussed
above, or, despite the disclaimers, choose a substantive result, e.g. pro-domesticplaintiff, to be addressed in the next section.2"
26.

31 N.Y.2d 121,335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).

27.

Brilmayer, Directions, supra note 9, at 170-81.

See also generally, Kramer, Rethinking,

supra note 1.
28. See also PatrickJ.Borchers, The Choice-of-LawRevolution: An EmpiricalStudy,49 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 357 (1992).
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VII. YES, VIRGINIA, THERE IS "CONFLICTS JUSTICE" (HEREIN OF THE
CONUNDRUM WITH "MODERN," "JUST" OR "BEST" RESULTS)!

My sixth point is that the question of whether a state has the power and a good

reason to apply its own or another law in a particular context is entirely different
from the question of whether the chosen law is substantively just. In other words,
I believe that the task of conflicts is to select the jurisdiction whose law is to apply
and that such selection should be just in an allocation sense as well as
content-neutral, with the public policy exception for outrageous rules beyond
the pale. I must confess here that I am so dumb as not even to understand
how it could be otherwise! Perhaps my wrong-headedness comes from my
tendency to distinguish between the judicial and the legislative fuictions.
Starting with the courts, it seems to me that no one disputes the conflictsjustice proposition that if all territorial and personal connections of a
transaction are with the forum state, its law should apply, period, even ifthe courts
do not consider it right. Likewise, if all connections are with only one other state,
its law should be chosen subject only to the narrow public policy exception for
outrageous rules. It seems equally obvious to me that in a multistate transaction,
where there are also some "reasonable" contacts with the forum state, the choice of
whether to apply forum or another law may not be made on the basis ofwhether the
court considers that the forum law leads to "just," "best," "modem," or what not
29
results through a process of particularistic judicial intuitionism.

By

definition, the court must consider the law adopted by its own legislature or
through precedent as just, best or modem. Thus, the determination ofwhat
is a "reasonable" contact for choice of law purposes, and where does it lead,
must be made on other, jurisdiction-selecting criteria. It is only when the
multistate transaction has no contact whatsoever with the forum state,
29. "It is a truism to say that all law aims in the end at justice in the individual case. But, what
is justice and how can we find it? Certainly not by pulling an outcome out of some hat. This approach
is dangerous because it implies that just results can be perceived directly, through some form of
impressionist intuition, rather than reasoned out and explained publicly in reliance on existing norms."
Kozyris, Half Full,supra note 4, at 956. "Adding [to the conflicts quest] an intention to seek justice
in the individual case not only introduces an even more impressionistic and preferential, ifnot quixotic,
dimension but tends to confuse issues of legitimate authority with subjective perceptions about the
merits of particular substantive rules. Mixing up 'who decides' with 'what should be decided' is likely
to add neither clarity nor rational justifications beyond personal preferences for the proposed choices."
Kozyris, Values and Methods, supra note 4, at 484. "[J]ust results and better laws [are] labels often
placed on pro-plaintiff,pro-recovery solutions without identification oftheapplicable sources ofjustice
and goodness and without regard for actuarial soundness and for cost-benefit considerations." Id. at
486. "Acenotaph is also needed for such words as 'fair', 'reasonable', 'functional', and 'workable'
when used tojustify a conflicts answer. These notorious question beggers and good-intention signallers
should be unmasked and recognized for what they are. Ina normative text, they merely invite the
decision makers to fill the empty vessel by drawing from some value system. However, they fail to
provide the system itself." Kozyris, Side Glance, supra note 4, at 570. "Collapsing the conflicts
inquiry into the quest for substantive justice, thus confusing questions of power... with those of
substantive results, and pursuing the holy grail through a self-centered policy analysis compounds the
mess." Id. at 578.
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hopefully a rare situation for jurisdictional reasons, that a judge need not
consider the spatial (territorial and personal) applicability of forum law. But
if he decides to make the choice between the other potentially applicable
rules on the basis of their content, again the jurisdiction-selecting criterion of
similarity with the law of the forum should inescapably prevail. Thus, doing
"justice in the individual (multistate) case" for me means selecting and properly
applying the law that is justly applicable on the basis ofthe appropriate connections
and, residually, the law30 of the forum. Does this not mean that there is such a thing
as "conflicts justice"?
When it comes to the legislature, it certainly may guide the courts, through
separate choice rules or through directions incorporated in the substantive statutes
themselves, on how far to apply forum or foreign law. Where it remains silent and
delphic, the judge may construct a common choice of law system along the lines
described in the previous paragraph. It should be pointed out that even where the
judge is totally parochial, ignores choice of law, and always applies the law of the
forum, he is doing "conflicts justice" in that he chooses such law jurisdictionally
and regardless of its content.
VIII. CONNECTING CONFLICTS TO JURISDICTION

While the jurisdictional issue is simpler, because the only (one-sided) question
is whether the forum will entertain the action, and while the justice considerations
are not identical, since here the state public concern about overburdening its courts
comes into play but also there is a presumption that the plaintiff schoice should not
be lightly disturbed, yet the decision is often made on the basis ofthe presence and
evaluation ofcontacts that resembles conflicts analysis, and the Ehrenzweig quest
for a "proper law at the proper forum" points in the right direction. In addition, for
all the reasons explained above, the choice of forum affects significantly the
(subsequent) choice oflaw and, thus, there is a strong incentive for the plaintiff(and
the defendant in declaratory actions) to engage in forum shopping.
My seventh point is that there should be concern about forum shopping but
only in proper measure. I would not propose limiting the parties to a single forum.
On the other hand, certain general jurisdictional bases, such as personal-presence,
doing-substantial-business, plaintiffs-nationality and presence-of-property, are
potentially excessive and burdensome and distortive ofchoice of law. Thus, either
they should be eliminated or they should be avoided through a generous application
ofthe forum non conveniens doctrine.
30. For a recent challenge to the "better law" syndrome, see Gary J. Simson, Resisting the Allure
ofBetter Rule ofLaw, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 141 (1999). See also,Kramer, Rethinking,supranote 1, at 33940. It is worth noting, with some sense of wonder, that Professor Brilmayer has been unwilling or
unable to take a clear-cut position on the relationship between choice of law policies and substantive

policies. See Lea Brilmayer, The Role ofSubstantiveandChoiceofLawPoliciesin theFormationand
Application ofChoiceofLawRules, 252 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy ofInternational Law
19-111 (1995). Professor Sterk argues persuasively that Brilmayer's positions on this dichotomy are
contradictory. Sterk, MarginalRelevance, supranote 1, at 1025-30.
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IX. THE SYMEONIDES THEORY: ON THE RIGHT TRACK!

My eighth point will give Professor Symeonides his theoretical due. First, he
should be praised for being open-minded and meticulously fair in assessing the
impact of the various theories on the living case law in his annual review in the
American Journalof ComparativeLaw. While the courts often are perplexed and
unsure about the new conflicts and offer us results elliptically supported by a
smorgasbord oftheory, in his role as the modem glossator ofconflicts, Symeonides
does his best to organize and explicate for the benefit not only of scholars and
lawyers but also ofjudges in the future.
Second, the two main thrusts of the Symeonides theory point in the right
direction. His espousal ofthe "comparative impairment" general approach, despite
its "interests" genealogy, by its own terms rejects the parochial, pro-forum, localinterests-first, content-affected biases which we condemned above. Further, his
emphasis on (almost infatuation with?!) the distinction in torts between conductregulating rules, where territoriality should reign, and loss-distributing standards,
where the personal contacts should carry the day, provides a reasonable contactbased and sovereignty-respecting starting point for making the right choices. My
main concern with the Symeonides theory lies not in its direction but in
manageability of those distinctions: recognizing and weighing "impairments" of

uncertain-elusive interests, sorting out "regulation of conduct" from "loss
distribution" etc., when most rules do both.3 My other concern relates to the
manner in which Symeonides particularizes his choices in fields such as, e.g.,
producers liability, as will be explained below.
X. FROM THEORY TO SPECIFICS: A "MODERN" CHOICE OF LAW FOR
PRODUCERS LIABILITY

The time now has come to test the above points in the chosen concrete field,
producers liability. To begin with, a few simple (perhaps oversimplified) facts
about the world ofproducers liability need to be summarized. First, let us keep in
mind the (conflicting) substantive policies behind the related laws: on the one hand,
there is a trend to favor recovery in tort from the manufacturer, regardless of fault,
by the persons harmed, assuming that he (and the investors) can better bear the risk
and/or spread it among all users; on the other hand, it is rather clear that generous
pro-recovery rules are likely to lead to some products disappearing from the market
as well as to increases in the cost ofproducts resulting in fewer choices and higher
prices to the detriment of all consumers. 2 Second, the production and distribution
31. For arecent critique on this point, see, e.g., Allen & O'Hara, supra note 5, at 1030-37.
32. The outcome of discrete litigation is bound to have pervasive effects on the safety
standards and costs of production of entire industries, intersecting with government
regulation, as well as on prices, thus affecting consumers as awhole. Also, the question of
how acceptable risk will eventually be handled extends beyond mere compensation into
insurance, first or third party, and even touches on general considerations of publicwelfare.
Less directly, the impact is likely to be felt by laborers, investors, lenders, and other
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of most typical products is certainly national (not local) in the broadest sense in the
United States and is becoming increasingly global. Two additional things
complicate matters: (a) while most states in the world do recognize some liability
in tort for harm resulting from the use ofproducts, compensation plans differ (and
this is going to increase) on how far injuries are better covered through social
insurance systems (and even private insurance, first-party policies) rather thantort
recoveries; and (b) the relationship between the potential contractual rights and the
tort claims of a victim who was the immediate purchaser ofthe product has been
unstable. Other issues also have some relevance: how to deal with the contributorycomparative negligence ofthe victim; whether conduct-regulation objectives should
be better addressed through criminal sanctions; how much weight should be given
for reasons of fairness and predictability to the planning of activities, including
waivers of liability?
Recognizing that this is a very important field and that we need to propose, if
at all possible, some intelligent but also intelligible conflicts guidelines, based on
some form of consensus as to the indicated choices, we should not recoil
from articulating a set of specific rules, on the Neumeier v. Kuehner model,
to cover the typical situations. All the same, we should not forget that what
we are trying to do will be by definition imperfect and questionable, not so
much because of our own weaknesses but for the simple and plain reason
that we are trying to straightjacket into local, provincial, substantive rules activities
that are multistate and multinational par excellence: The obviously better overall
approach here would have been to develop common substantive rules for
"interstate" or "international" producers liability for situations with contacts with
many states, inthe manner, e.g., ofthe Vienna Convention on the International Sale
ofGoods.
Many scholars, including Professor Symeonides and the present author, have
attempted in the recent past to move to the specifics of a regime for producers
liability. The ideawas to transcend the vague, delphic "approaches," which provide
high-sounding pronouncements that can support almost anything, and move to
concrete choice rules which would lead to predictable yet reasonable outcomes, and
this a good time and place for a brief revisitation. The emphasis will be placed on
consumer products. Other kinds of products such as capital goods, including
machinery, public means of transport-airplanes, trains, electricity, etc., especially
single-event transnational mass disasters move in different patterns and require
participants in the production process, as well as taxpayers.
Kozyris, Half Full,supra note 4, at 969-70.
Drawing and maintaining the optimal safety line requires a cost-benefit analysis which
considers the socioeconomic and technological conditions and the prevailing ethic in the
particular society.... Because the line cannot be drawn at perfect safety, the liability rules
determine what incentives to create and where to place the losses.... Obviously, the
decision of whether and what to shift is motivated not only by compensatory and ethical
considerations, but also by concerns about deterrence (punitive damages), practicability,
administrative efficiency, and, last but not least, the effects of insurance on the distribution.
Kozyris, Side Glance, supra note 4, at 581-82.
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more specialized analysis, especially since typically the victim hanned has no
transactional link with the manufacturer.
With these reservations in mind, let me start with a few general conflicts
propositions which should guide us in our search. Proposition One: it is unfair for
a person to be subjected to the burdens of the law of a state with which he has no
deliberate and meaningful "affiliating circumstances" (we used to call them contacts
or connections). Proposition Two: it is notjust for a person to receive the benefits
of the law of a state with which he also has no such affiliations. It follows from

these two propositions that the affiliating circumstances should be normally mutual,

i.e., connecting both (all) parties to the applicable law.33 Proposition Three: given
the presence of significant countervailing considerations as to the availability and
cost of products, there should be no substantive bias in favor ofrecovery, except in
the most residual no-other-choice sense. Optional safety standards and levels,

sources and types of compensation involve delicate balancing judgments which
should not be second-guesses in the conflicts process, especially on a ex post
sympathy basis.34 Proposition Four: since there are significant variations on how
far product-related injuries are compensated through tort recoveries or socialprivate insurance plans, and a delicate balance is often pursued, an effort should be
made to apply the chosen law as a whole, avoiding d~pegage. Proposition Five: in
view of the typical presence of a deliberate transaction, directly or indirectly,
between the manufacturer and the injured or damaged consumer, at the market
where the product was delivered and received, and ofthe fact that the issues do not
relate to "status," the territorial connections should predominate over the personal.
The conflicts rules which I will attempt to articulate below seek to cover the
greatest number of the typical factual contexts for consumer-type producers
liability. After I describe and explain them, I will add some observations on

33. These propositions are eloquently explained and defended in Brilmayer, Directions, supra
note 9, at 253-59. See also, Lea Brilmayer, Rights. Fairnessand Choice ofLaw, 98 Yale L. J.1277
(1989). In aletter dated March 23, 1990, Professor Larry Kramer, Professor of Law at the University
of Chicago, has expressed the view that these propositions (as well as the desirability of holding
dpeMage to a tolerable level) are not self-evident and need to.be defended on their merits. To be sure,
a general philosophical text on conflicts, such as the Brilmayer article above, should include such a
defense; however, I responded in aletter dated April 12, 1990, that in my judgment these propositions
are so overwhelmingly accepted that they need not be belabored upon when referred to in other
particularized contexts.
34. Where product liabilityisat stake, the ultimate effects ofproviding compensation are
not confined to the transfer of wealth from an actor to avictim merely to redress individual
harm. Decisions ofwhether there isliability,and for how much, are bound totranscend the
interests of the particular litigants and affect the practices of entire industries, with
repercussions for the economy in general. Another reason why the principle of
compensation is questionable isthat it addresses the loss situation ex post (after the event),
rather than ex ante, as it should be. Inmany situations, it isquite possible that the plaintiff
had been already compensated ex ante for assuming the risk,for example, bypaying alower
price for the product. Favoring recoveries in the form of tort damages undermines other
options ofhandling losses-social or first-party insurance-and reduces opportunities to use
resources in the marketplace to satisfy other preferences.
Kozyris, Half Full, supra note 4, at 961.
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comparable schemes and then test them against the case law from the perspective
of results. I hope to be able to show that they are consistent with the outcomes of
a large number of cases and that, therefore, from the perspective ofpractical utility,
they are preferable to the often convoluted and contradictory theoretical
justifications which burden the courts when struggling with these situations. My
basic style of presentation will focus on combinations ofthe significant affiliations
(places of acquisition-delivery, of availability through commercial channels, of
domicile ofvictim and of harm, i.e. injury or damage) from the perspective ofwhat
both the manufacturer and the victim are entitled to expect and cannot complain
against. Needless to say, what I will propose here does not significantly differ from
35
what I have advocated in earlier writings, but it does constitute a refinement.
I propose first that the tort claim against the manufacturer ofa victim harmed
by a commercially distributed consumer product that was acquired by him or on his
behalf or for use by him (i.e., some privity broadly defined) should be governed by
the law of the state chosen in the following lexical order: Rule (a) his home state at
the time of such acquisition there or such acquisition in another state if also at that
time the same kind of product of the same manufacturer was also so available at his
home state. Incidentally, since we are dealing with liability in tort, not contract, I
mean by "acquisition" the place where the product was delivered pursuant to
agreement, not where the agreement itselfwas made. It is there that the product will
likely rest and cause harm. This clarification is specially important for instances of
remote sales. Rule (a) should not be controversial. The victim is entitled to have
the benefit ofthe law of his home where he acquires-receives the product, and the
manufacturer is entitled to the protection of the law ofthe place where he markets
and delivers the product to a local person. It follows that the victim should be
limited to such law because of the entitlement of the manufacturer and vice versa.
The victim should also have the benefit ofhis own law when such product was then
commercially available there even ifhe so acquired it in another state, on the theory
that it is not unfair to the manufacturer as the place of actual acquisition is not
important in these circumstances in terms of calculating his exposure.
I propose next, especially for the benefit of third parties or the so-called
bystanders who did not themselves acquire the product or it was not acquired for
use by them, but not limited to them, as Rule (b), that the victim in all situations
should be entitled to opt for the law of the place ofharm if it coincides with his then
home, provided that when the product was originally acquired the same kind ofthe
same manufacturer was also available there through commercial channels. This
option reflects the perception that a person injured at home should be entitled to that
law; and protects the manufacturer from unfairness through the requirement that
such product at the time of the transaction of acquisition was also available there
through commercial channels.
Finally, for all hopelessly non-local situations, where the significant affiliations

are so dispersed as not to come within these concentrations, I would propose as a
35. Kozyris, HalfFull;Kozyris, Values and Methods; and Kozyris, Side Glance, supra note 4;
P. John Kozyris, ChoiceofLawfor ProductsLiability: Whither Ohio?,48 Ohio St. L. J.377 (1987).
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residual (lesser evil) Rule (c), a pure and simple application of the law of the state
of the consensual acquisition-delivery at the initial transaction on a theory of ease
of application, of more likely fairness as party-mutual and of greater consistency
with the basic assumption of state authority.
This scheme reflects my earlier Propositions One and Two that the chosen law
must be connected to both parties and the basic thought that the key "affiliating"
circumstance in this kind of liability is the transaction whereby the product is
acquired (deliberately delivered and received for use) in the market. It is there that
the manufacturer has deliberately put in circulation the "defective" product capable
of causing injury and it is there that the person who acquired the product went
deliberately for that purpose. The choice becomes overwhelming when that state
is also the victim's domicile, as under Rule (a). While that latter contact, standing
by itself, should not suffice, when it is coupled with commercial availability there,
the balance shifts in that direction. It should be noted that Rule (a) focuses on the
protection ofthe person who had a transactional connection with the manufacturer
at the place of acquisition-distribution-delivery. By contrast, Rule (b) is intended
to cover mostly third parties who were harmed in their home state and had done
nothing to affiliate themselves with another state. We generally take into account
the fact that the manufacturer should foresee the possibility ofthe product leaving
the state of transaction and causing harm to a domiciliary of another state of his
commercial distribution or to a domiciliary ofthe state ofharm. This concentration
of contacts in another state justifies the subjection of the manufacturer to its laws
in these circumstances. Rule (c) covers the situation where no other state has any
significant mutual contacts.
The centrality of the transaction of acquisition also manifests itself in two
intertemporal contexts. First, commercial availability should be determined as of
the time of acquisition, not of harm. A manufacturer should not be able to avoid
the law of a state by discontinuing to serve its market after the acquisition but, by
the same token, he should be free to start serving a market and not be subjected to
its law for products which had been sold elsewhere at an earlier time. Second, I
would assume that any change in the chosen law subsequent to the time of
acquisition, either expanding or limiting the rights of the victim, should be
disregarded.
. It is obvious that I deliberately left out two contacts that often are mentioned
as at least relevant, if not significant, in the texts, the literature and in some cases:
(a) the place where the product was designed and/or made, and (b) the "domicile"
or principal place of business of the manufacturer. I have explained elsewhere in
greater detail why I consider the place of designing-making irrelevant either by
itself or even when combined with other factors.36 Since we are dealing here not
36. See Kozyris, Side-Glance,supra note 4,at 583, and Kozyris, ValuesandMethods,supranote
4, at 491-501. Professor Weintraub has suggested that my opposition to the place of manufacture
reflects a"last-event" analysis reminiscent of Section 377 of the First Restatement ofConflicts. Russell
J.Weintraub, The Contributions ofSymeonides andKozyris to Making Choice ofLaw Predictable and

Just: An Appreciation and Critique,38 Am. J.Comp. L.511,519 (1990) ("Appreciation"). While I
do not belong to those who wish to exorcise the First Restatement, I would like to point out that the
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with criminal activity, and not with activity that can cause any harm by itself, but
only with the civil compensation of persons harmed by products, it seems to me that
the state where the preparatory acts of merely designing and making (and storing)
the product are taking place has no reason to concern itself with its specifications

and with the potential recoveries for harm caused. The product cannot cause any
harm until it is delivered to a user, until it is placed in the market. It is the state

where those transactions take place that has the major reason to address these
issues, and balance the considerations, both for preventive and for corrective

purposes.37 The fact that a product is often placed in the market where it was made,
can be dealt with directly through the last connector. An additional problem here

is multiplicity, since often the related contacts are dispersed through the many
places of operation ofmultistate or multinational enterprises. Next, the "domicile"

of the manufacturer, unlike that ofthe victim, by itself has no connection with the
acquisition, use and harm ofthe product.3" The fact that unilateral decisions may
be made there about the design, manufacture and even marketing of the product
should not be enough, for purposes of simple civil liability, to trigger the

application of its law. Another major problem is the indefinite nature of a
manufacturer's "home" state: place of incorporation, situs of the headquarters,
principal place of business, place where the related decisions were made (but then

we get back to place of designing, making, etc.) or what? This latter position
reflects also my belief that the mere fact that a person "knows" (or is

deemed to know) a certain law, e.g., that of its domicile, should not count
on the issue of the "unfairness" of being subjected to it. The pertinent question is

whether to be subjected to such law in these circumstances, and where the
connections exist, it is not the knowledge that makes it fair and, by the same token,
neither does lack ofknowledge provide an excuse.39 It is heartening to report that
the recent case law increasingly recognizes the validity ofthe above analysis and
places the emphasis
on the place where the product is "placed in the stream of
40
commerce."
place ofmanufacture is the first rather than the last event necessary to make the defendant liable!
37. Professor Fawcett has criticized my approach on this issue, suggesting that it would
encourage "reprehensible behaviour" by manufacturers who can thus "dump goods in a low liability
state." J.J.Fawcett, Products Liability in PrivateInternationalLaw: A Eurpoean Perspective,238

Collected Courses ofthe Hague Academy 11, 187 (1993-I) ("Fawcett"). But this is exactly the point,
that it is the state where products are marketed, delivered and used which should have the primary
authority to decide where to draw the cost-benefit line and how to regulate the relationship among actors
and claimants fairly connected there.
38.

Kozyris, Side-Glance,supra note 4, at 585.

39.

The inappropriateness of these two connectors is beautifully illustrated in the recent case of

Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 933 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1996), discussed infra at Appendix B, where the
law of the place of making and principal place ofbusiness were relied upon to shield the manufacturer
from liability even though the product had been placed in the steam ofcommerce and had injured a
foreign domiciliary elsewhere. This result should be just plainly unacceptable under any reasonable
approach.
40. See Egan v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 677 So. 2d 1027 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996)
(infra at Appendix A); Maly v. General Indust., Inc., No. 94 C 3611, 1996 WL28473 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23,
1996) (infra at Appendix A); Mahoney v. Ronnie's Road Serv., 468 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
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It should be recognized here that mine are not the only proposals for choice of
law in producers tort liability which are sufficiently concrete as to lead to
predictable outcomes. At least five other sets meet that requirement." There is not
much space here to comment on them at length so I will make only a couple ofbrief
comparative points about them. First, the major Hague Convention on the Law
42
Applicable to Products Liability, is already in effect in eight European states. The
Convention has many virtues: it is forum and party neutral, not giving either party
major options, it eschews parochialism, it is comprehensive and multilateral and
admits almost no d~pegage. In addition, the following connectors quite appropriately play a major role, although not in the combinations which I have proposed:
the victim's habitual residence, the place of the product acquisition by the victim,
the place of harm and the places of the commercial availability of the product.
However, the Convention also relies heavily on the principal place of business of
43
the defendant. Second, the "proper law" proposal of Professor Cavers: it is slanted
in favor of the victim, giving him options among the law of the states where the
product was designed or approved, or of his habitual residence where it was
acquired or caused harm, or of the place where it was acquired and caused harm.
The producer is only given a commercial-availability veto. Third, Article 135 of
the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law of 1987 adopts a simple rule
to the effect that the victim may choose either the law of the defendant's place of
business or habitual residence or the law of the state of acquisition unless the
product was marketed there without consent. The damages awarded, however, may
not exceed those available under Swiss law. My objections would focus on the first
leg of the choices, on the elimination of the victim's home and the place ofharm,
as well as on the limitation of damages. Next, Professor Weintraub has been
refining an approach which has a lot of merit. His principal choice for the main
issues is the law of the victim's habitual residence if the product was commercially
available there or if the defendant so chooses. Ifthat is not applicable, however, he
gives first the victim and then the defendant a choice of one of the following three
contacts: (a) defendant's principal place of business, (b) where the product was
acquired or caused harm, subject to the commercial availability proviso or (c) the
(infra at Appendix A); Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 943 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky. 1996)
(infra at Appendix A); Batruk, Romani, Vestal, Rice, Mallins, Farrell, infraat Appendix A. Cf.Ness,
infra at Appendix B. But see McDonald, Poust, Denman, infra at Appendix A. For older supporting
cases, see, e.g., Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Harrison
v. Wyeth Labs, 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aft'd, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); McCrossin v. Hicks
Chevrolet, 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. App. 1969); Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988); and
Crisman v. Cooper Indus., 748 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App. 1988). For recent support of the "place ofsale"
rule in this field, see, e.g., Allen & O'Hara, supra note 5, at 1046.
41. For an excellent description anI evaluation of these as well as other approaches, including
my earlier positions, see Fawcett, supra note 37, at 136-94. For other contributions to the discussion,
see, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts ofLaw and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80
Geo. L.J. 617 (1992).
42. 11 I.L.M. 1283 (1972).
43. David F. Cavers, The ProperLaw ofProducer's Liability,26 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 703,728-29
(1977).
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place of design, manufacturing or maintenance of the product or any of its
components." My main disagreements relate to these latter items: the use of the
defendant's home state in (a) and the acceptance of a smorgasbord of contacts on
the manufacturer's side under (c).
I would like now to address the Symeonides approach for producers liablity,
as reflected in the Louisiana codification," but also as more fully elaborated in a
recent article."' Article 3545 of the Louisiana Civil Code contains a special
unilateral rule for products liability in favor of Louisiana law in certain contexts
and relegates all other choices to the general conflicts regime. Basically, local law
applies to the claim of a domiciliary (resident) ofLouisiana injured there or injured
in another state by a product manufactured or acquired in Louisiana, and to the
injury in Louisiana to any person if the product was manufactured or acquired in
Louisiana; provided that the product (or ofthe same kind of the same manufacturer)
was commercially available in Louisiana. My general comment is favorable on four
of the five contacts used: domicile ofvictim, place of injury, place of acquisition,
place of commercial availability, and the combinations that I have proposed above
are quite similar although not identical. The only particular objection aims at the
place of manufacture. I am also concerned about the pro-forum effect of a
unilateral rule and to residual reference to the all-too-general tort conflicts criteria.47

44. Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort
Litigation, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 129, 148. See also Russell J. Weintraub, The Contributions of
Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable and Just: An Appreciation and
Critique, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 511 (1990), and Russell J. Weintraub, A Proposed Choice-of-Law
Standardfor InternationalProductLiability Disputes, 16 Brook. J. Int'l L. 225,238 (1990). An earlier
tendency to opt for the law favoring compensation has been moderated in pieces such as his An
Approach to Choice ofLaw that Focuses on Consequences, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 701, 719-20 (1993). In
his most recent piece, Russell J. Weintraub, Conflict of Lawsfor Products Liability: Demagnetizing
the United StatesForum, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 157 (1999) ("Demagnitizing"), he places the emphasis on the
law of the home of the victim and at the same time, quite appropriately, objects strenuously to the
practice ofmany lower courts to cling to the notion that the standards and calculation of damages is a
"procedural" issue subject to the law of the forum, with the result that U.S. producers, amenable to suit
at home, are subjected to the generous compensation rules of the United States even in situations where
the dispute has no connection whatsoever with this country. To prevent this abuse ofjurisdictional
rules, federal draft legislation had required the application of the lex loci delicti to product liability
actions brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. citizens for harm that occurred abroad. S. 1996, Cong.
Rec. S.18805-6 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987).
45. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana 'sNewLaw ofChoice ofLaw for Tort Conflicts: An
Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677 (1992) and Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two
Surprises, 54 La. L. Rev. 497 (1994).
46. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Needfor a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposalfor
Tort Conflicts) (paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Section on Conflicts of the
American Association of Law Schools, under publication, on file with the author) ("Third
Restatement"), at 11-13.
47. See Kozyris, Values and Methods, supra note 4, at 509. Professor Symeonides hasresponded
and pointed out that the total package is not unilateral and that, for the situations left out, probably not
too many, the proper conflicts approach is still controversial. Symeon C. Symeonides, Problems and
Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law for Torts: The Louisiana Experience in Comparative
Perspective, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 431,464-69 (1990).
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The new Symeonides proposal is multilateral and contains a major option feature,
48
originating with Professor Cavers and also employed by Professor Weintraub,
giving the parties certain reasonable choices. Under the Symeonides plan, the
plaintiff may choose the law of any state where at least two of the following
significant named contacts are concentrated: (a) injury (b) domicile of victim (c)
home of defendant (d) place of manufacture and (e) place of acquisition (by
anyone); provided, again, that the requirement of commercial availability is met.
If he is entitled but fails to exercise it, then the defendant may choose only the law
of state of(a) and (b)." The above comments about the Louisiana codification also
apply here with the added, and serious, objection against the introduction of the
home of the manufacturer as a significant contact, as explained above. As to the
option feature, I do support its use, but in more limited circumstances. My more
generalized concern relates to the residual choice and the escape clause of the
Symeonides plan. Not only is he calling for a return to the vagaries and
uncertainties generated by Sections 6 and 145 of the Second Restatement, amplified
by an additional and only potential escape clause under the "principles" of the
Restatement, but also adds the burden of classifying substantive rules as either
conduct regulating or loss distributing, which complicates matters considerably in
this mixed field.5" Thankfully, given the extensive coverage of the Symeonides
particular producers liability conflicts regime, only marginal situations will call for
resorting to all this guesswork.
The time has come finally to assess how my proposed Rules would have
decided the recent cases of producers liability to consumers, where issues of
substantive choice of law were involved, as reported and analyzed by none other
than Professor Symeonides in his contributions to the American Journal of
ComparativeLaw for the last six years in chronological order." I have made this
assessment in Appendices A and B at the end of this article, starting with the cases
where the results appear consistent with the Rules. I should note here three things.
First, for informational purposes, I do list the forum, even though in most cases no
explicit reference is made or weight is given to it. Second, in no case was there
doubt about commercial availability, so this factor played no role in the outcomes.
Third, I sometimes cite both my Rules (a) and (c), the reason being that the facts do
not reveal clearly the extent and nature of the relationship between the original
acquirer and the victim.
XI. CONCLUSION

Apr~s le deluge, then what? Preoccupied with chasing rainbows, "modem"
conflicts theory has neglected to preserve in the Ark the hard-core concepts and
methods that would inform the new era. Interest analysis may have charmed and
48.

See supra note 44.

49.

See Symeonides, supra note 46; Thiid Restatement, supra note 46, at 16.

50. See Symeonides, supra note 46; Third Restatement, supranote 46, §§1-6 at 15-16.
51. Cited in Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1998,47 Am.
J.Comp. L. 327 (1999).
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browbeat us into admiration but, on further reflection, it has revealed its serious
shortcomings: mythical legislative intent, parochialism, selfishness, selfrighteousness, one-sidedness, manipulability. "Most significant relationship,"
"grouping ofcontacts," "proper law" and the like moved in the right direction but,
by being all things to all people, by referring to all possible contacts and
considerations, however incompatible, opened the door to chaos. Nevertheless,
their supplementation with presumptions provided some needed guidance. "Best,"
"modem," etc. law sounds good, but it is impressionistic and incompatible with the
judicial function; furthermore, it calls for making ad hoc judgments in the rushed
and restricted conditions of adjudication where a more reflective and
comprehensive approach is needed.
In my judgment, our "rethinking" should be resigned to the simple reality that
choice of law in the private sphere involves delineating the authority of a state to
impose its own sense of justice on events and persons that fairly come within its
power. Since the considerations both of public power and of private fairness
revolve around contacts, with emphasis on purposeful and mutual affiliations, we
are reduced to choosing which territorial and personal contacts ofthe litigants, and
in what concentrations, point to the choice ofwhich law. Ofcourse, conflicts theory
only studies and proposes: it is for the states to enact or adopt particular conflicts
regimes.
Professor Symeonides is on the right track when he responds to the
"comparative impairment" philosophy of treating all states as equal; and, even
better, when he seeks to resolve the personal-territorial dilemma through the
"conduct regulation" versus "loss distribution" distinction. The problem, however,
of translating these preferences to concrete choices still looms large. Professor
Symeonides has gone further and has given us, in an important and controversial
field such as producers liability, the concrete (albeit unilateral and partial)
Louisiana Rule as well as a proposal for a narrowly drafted section of a new
Conflicts Restatement. While my own ideas and proposals are not identical, there
is considerable common ground and room for accommodation. My preferences
revolve around more particularized and narrow rules as building blocks for a Third
Restatement. I am mindful of the danger of transforming the current state of a
thousand cases to that of a thousand rules and hope that we could accommodate a
large number oftypical situations within a relatively short universe ofrules. In the
field ofproducts liability, Ipropose rules only for consumer products (there is little
reason why airplane single-event mass disasters should be treated in a similar
conflicts fashion as discreet discomforts from bottles of Coke) and I place the
emphasis on the place of marketing-distribution, use, commercial
availability-and on the home ofthe victim, rejecting both the place ofmaking and
the home ofthe defendant. I also consider it crucial to avoid open-ended-"unless"type escape clauses, which undermine the rules and invite ex post improvisations.
I tried to show that most of the cases would have been decided the same way under
my proposals and that in virtually all the cases my proposals would have produced
better, or at least as defensible, choices.
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My last admonition is not to forget the inherent limitations of the current
choice-of-law process. All too often, we are trying to choose which local law to
apply to non-local transactions and relationships; and this straight-jacketing comes
at a point where the procedure has already been burdened with the jurisdictional
phase and where the main task is to interpret and apply some law rather than choose
it. In those contexts, the guidance that we provide should be as concrete as
possible, intelligible even to "dummies"; and those who challenge us with the siren
song of perfectionism should be ignored unless they can come up with a better and
at least equally workable alternative.
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APPENDIX A
1. Hallv.Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). Car. Law
of North Carolina (place of acquisition, then home of victim, injury-not
Michigan: forum, place of design, home of defendant, current domicile of
victim; not: Ohio, place ofmaking); statute ofrepose, for defendant; Rule (a).
2. Romani v. Cramer, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1998). Chair. Law of
Connecticut (place of acquisition by employer, injury-not Massachusetts:
forum, domicile of victim); statute of repose, for defendant; Rule (b).
3. Batruk v. MitsubishiMotors Corp., Nos. 44 Civ. 7593, 94 Civ 8677, 1998 WL
307383 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1998). Car. Law of Haiti (place of acquisition by
others, Haitian domiciliaries, injury-not New York: forum, domicile of one
victim; not: Florida, domicile of other victim; not: Japan, place of making,
home of defendant); for defendant; Rule (b).
4. Hollisterv. Dayton Hudson Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
Blouse. Law of Michigan (forum, place of acquisition by domiciliary-not
Illinois, place of injury; not Ohio, home of defendant); risk-utility test, for
defendant; Rule (a).
5. Nygaardv. UnitedParcelServ. Gen. Servs. Co., I F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Or.
1998), and four more cases decided by the same court on the same facts for
different plaintiffs. Hand-held computer. Law of place ofeach victim's injury
and domicile; summary judgment by defendant partially denied, Rule (b).
6. Pallen v. United Parcel Serv. Gen. Servs. Co., 997 F. Supp. 1367 (D.
Or. 1998). Same.
7. Bracciv. UnitedParcelServ. Gen. Servs. Co., No. Civ 95-1240-FR, 1998 WL
126862 (D. Or. Mar. 17, 1998). Same.
8. McCloskey v. UnitedParcelServ. Gen. Servs. Co., No. Civ. 95-420-FR, 1998
WL 126865 (D. Or. Mar. 17, 1998). Same.
9. Hernandezv. UnitedParcelServ. Gen. Servs. Co., No. 95-1767-FR, 1998 WL
126867 (D. Or. Mar. 17, 1998). Same.
10. Vestal v. Shiley, Inc., No. SACV96-1205-GLT, 1997 WL 910373 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 1997). Heart valve. Law of North Carolina (place of acquisition for
his benefit, domicile of victim, injury-not California: forum, place ofmaking,
home of defendant); statute of repose, for defendant; Rule (a).
11. Maly v. GeneralIndus., Inc., No. 94 C 3611, 1996 WL 28473 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
23, 1996). Boat. Law of Illinois (forum, place of acquisition at domicile of
victim, doing business by defendant;-not: Wisconsin, place of harm;-not:
Florida, home of manufacturer, place of making); statute of repose; for
defendant; Rule (a).
12. Mahoney v. Ronnie's Road Serv., 468 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal
denied, 476 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 1996). Airbrake. Law of North Carolina
(forum, placing in the market, harm, manufacturing:-not Arizona, domicile
of victim; statute of repose; for defendant; Rule (c).
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13. Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 943 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky.
1996). Tire. Law of Indiana (place of acquisition of car by local domiciliary,
current domicile of victim, harm, forum?;-not: Kansas, where tire
made;-not: Kentucky, forum, where tire mounted on car;-not: Ohio; home
of maker); statute of repose, for defendant; Rule (c).
14. Egan v. KaiserAluminum & Chem. Corp., 677 So. 2d 1027 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 684 So. 2d 930, (La. 1996). Asbestos. Law of Louisiana
(forum, domicile of victim, place of harm; not: Ohio, place of manufacturing);
punitive damages; for defendant; Rules (a) and (c).
15. Kramer v. Showa Denko K.K., 929 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Drug. Law
of New York (forum, place of acquisition by victim, local domiciliary,
harm;-not Japan, place of making, home of manufacturer); statute of repose;
for plaintiff; Rule (a).
16. Alexander v. GeneralMotors Corp., 478 S.E. 2d 123 (Ga. 1996). Car seat.
Law of Georgia (forum, place of acquisition by victim, local domiciliary;-not
Virginia, place of harm); strict liability; for plaintiff; Rule (a).
17. Pollack v. Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc., 939 F. Supp. 151 (D. Conn. 1996).
Tire. Law of Connecticut (forum, apparently place of acquisition by victim,
local domiciliary;-not Ohio, where made at home by manufacturer);
causation; for plaintiff; Rule (a).
18. Kemp v. Pfizer,Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Mich. 1996). Heart valve made
in California by California corporation, implanted in Michigan on local
domiciliary, harm there. The court applied the Michigan law barring punitive
damages, primarily on a lex fori theory. Same result under Rule (a).
19. Nesladek v. FordMotor Co., 46 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 1995). Transmission gear.
Law of Nebraska (place of acquisition of car at home by plaintiff, death of
child-not Minnesota, forum, doing business by defendant, place of
installation, current domicile of plaintiff); statute of repose, for defendant;
Rules (a) and (c).
20. Bonti v. FordMotor Co., 898 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Miss. 1995). Car. Law of
North Carolina (place of acquisition at home by plaintiff, death of husband,
also North Carolina domiciliary; not: South Carolina, place of accident;-not:
Mississippi, forum, doing business by defendant;-not: Michigan, place of
design;-not Kentucky, place of assembly); statute of repose, for defendant;
Rules (a) and (c).
21. Spillanev. GeorgiaPac. Corp., No. Civ. A. 93-1509, 1995 WL 71183 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 17. 1995). Roofing materials. Law ofPennsylvania (forum, place of
acquisition by employer at home, domicile of victirn-not: New Jersey, place
of injury); effectiveness of warning, denial of summary judgment for
defendant; Rule (c).
22. Schmidt v. Duo-Fast,Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-6541, 1995 WL 422681 (E.D. Pa
Jul. 11, 1995). Nail gun. Law of New Jersey (place of delivery at purchase to
local employer, injury-not: Pennsylvania, domicile ofvictim-worker); misuse;
Rule (c).
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23. Tucker v. BrandNames, Inc., No. 32661-9-I, 1995 WL 273481 (Wash. Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 1995). Climbing harness. Law of Oregon (place of acquisition
by local domiciliary, domicile of victim, place of injury-not: Washington,
where product made and home of defendant); comparative negligence; for
defendant; Rule (c).
24. HarlanFeeders, Inc. v.. GrandLabs. Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1400 (N.D. Iowa
1995). Vaccine. Law of Nebraska (place of acquisition at home, damage to
livestock-not: Iowa: forum, production;-not: South Dakota: home of
defendant); punitive damages; for defendant; Rule (a).
25. Rice v. Dow Chem., 875 P.2d 1213 (Wash. 1994). Herbicide. Law of Oregon
(place of delivery at purchase to local employer, then domicile of plaintiff,
exposure-not Washington: forum, manifestation of symptoms, current
domicile of victim); statute of repose, for defendant; Rules (a) and (c).
Excellent opinion.
26. Dormanv. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. ), cert. denied,513 U.
S. 964, 115 S. Ct. 428 (1994). Saw. Law of British Columbia (place of
acquisition of victim at home, injury;-not Missouri: forum, place of design
and testing, home of defendant licensor; not Taiwan: place ofmaking, home of
manufacturer); negligence v. strict liability, for defendant; Rule (a).
27. Beals v. Sicpa SecurinkCorp., Civ. A. Nos. 92-1512, 92-2588, and 93-0190,
1994 WL 236018 (D. D. C. May 17, 1994). Ink. Law of Virginia (place of
delivery at acquisition to government-employer, making, home of
acquirer;-not: District of Columbia: place of injury, home of victim
employees); negligence-compensatory-damages v. strict liability- punitive, for
defendant; Rules (a) and (c).
28. Farrellv. FordMotor Co., 501 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal
denied, 519 N.W.2d 158 (Mich. 1994). Car. Law ofNorth Carolina (place of
acquisition at home, death;-not: Michigan: forum, place of design and
making, defendant's home); statute of repose, for defendant; Rule (a).
Excellent opinion.
29. Magnant v. Medtronic, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 204 (W.D. Mich. 1994). Heart
pacemaker. Law of Minnesota (place of acquisition, use, injury; design and
making, defendant's home;-not Michigan: forum, victim's home); strict
liability, for plaintiff; Rule (c).
30. Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 96 (D. Conn. 1993). Gun.
Law of Oregon (place of acquisition by local person, injury;-not: place of
making, home of defendant); statute of repose, for defendant; Rule (a).
31. Dormanv. Emerson Elec. Co., 815 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mo. 1993), aff'd in
part,reversed in parton other grounds,23 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert.denied
513 U.S. 964, 115 S. Ct. 428 (1994). Saw. Law ofBritish Columbia (place of
acquisition by a local person;-not: Missouri, where product made by local
company); no strict liability; for defendant; Rule (a).
The cases that do not fit the above system are considerably fewer and are listed
in Appendix B. Their reasoning, where revealed, deserves special comment.
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APPENDIX B
1. Denman v. Snapper Div., 131 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1998). Lawnmower.
Manufactured in Georgia by Georgian company, acquired in Mississippi (forum)
by local domiciliary. Later loaned to relative domiciliary ofNorth Carolina,
injury there. North Carolina substantive statute of repose was applied,
principally on alex loci basis, to bar the action. Does it make sense to shield the
manufacturer in that type of situation? It was justly criticized by Symeonides. 2
Rule (c) would have called for the law of Mississippi.
2. Davis v. Shiley, 64 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (Cal. App. 4th
1998), designated as "not for publication" by the Supreme Court. Heart valve,
acquired and implanted in Oregon on Oregon domiciliary. Product made by
Californian in California (forum). Oregon's shorter statute of repose was not
applied on the ground that California has a policy of applying its own limitation
periods "to protect California residents and courts from stale claims" (at 830).
The nonsequitur of such reasoning was noted by Symeonides." Rule (a) would
have called for the law of Oregon.
3. Petrokehagiasv. Sky Climber,Inc., Nos. Civ. A. 96-CV-6965, Civ. A 97-CV3889, 1998 WL 227236 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 1998). Scaffolding, made and leased
in New Jersey to New Jersey employer, harmed Pennsylvania and New Jersey
domiciliary employees in Massachusetts, forum state. Law of Massachusetts
applied on the issues of strict liability and calculation of damages. Just lex loci?
Rule (c) would have called for the law of New Jersey.
4. Poust v. Huntleigh HealthCare,998 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.J. 1998). Pneumatic
compression device made in New Jersey (forum) by New Jersey corporation,
injuring Pennsylvania domiciliary in Maryland. Place ofacquisition: apparently
Maryland. Applied New Jersey pro-defendant law on the calculation of
damages.
5. MacDonaldv. GeneralMotors Corp., 110 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997). Van made
by defendant in Michigan, sold in Kansas to local university, death of North
Dakotan student passenger in Tennessee accident (forum). Choice of law of
North Dakota, no-ceiling on damages, for the benefit of the there-domiciled
parents, since the defendant also does business there and the other plaintiffs had
already been subjected to law ofKansas. Any conflicts sense? Rules (a) and (c)
would have called for the law of Kansas.
6. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 933 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Car sold in
Pennsylvania to local domiciliary who was killed in the state. But law of
Michigan applied to shield the manufacturer from punitive damages because the
car had been manufactured in Michigan at the home of the company on the
theory that, at least on that kind of issue, Pennsylvania's interest analysis

52.
53.

Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 378.
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focuses on the place of defendant's conduct and on his principal place of
business! No comment!
7. LaPlantev. AmericanHonda Motor Co., Inc., 27 F.3d 731 (1st Cir. 1994). Allterrain vehicle, designed and made in Japan by Japanese company, acquisition
in Colorado and injury there to Rhode Island (forum) domiciliary soldier. Law
of.Rhode Island with no damage limits applied on a theory that Honda's
insurance rates are not likely to be affected, since it does business in all states.
Logical, sound?! Rules (a) and (c) would have called for the law of Colorado.
8. Ness v. FordMotorCo., No. 89 C 689, 1993 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 9938 (N.D. Ill.
July 20, 1993). Car, made by Ford in Michigan, garaged and registered and
apparently acquired in Illinois by local driver. Other Illinois domiciliary injured
as a passenger in Iowa accident. What law to apply? The court made some very
enlightening comments why the law of neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant's
domicile ought to control. In the first situation, such a rule "would permit a state
with little manufacturing to endow its citizens with generous protection
wherever they choose to travel without picking up any part of the cost" (at *5).
Likewise, in the second situation, the law of the state of manufacture "would
tend to leave victims uncompensated as states wishing to attract and hold
manufacturing companies would raise the threshold of liability and reduce
compensation." Since there is no alternative that will produce a rational and fair
result, let us go with the lex loci delicti. Rule (c) would have called for the law
of Illinois.

